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Abstract—Intentional interference constitutes a ma-
jor threat for communication networks operating over
a shared medium where availability is imperative.
Jamming attacks are often simple and cheap to im-
plement. In particular, today’s jammers can perform
physical carrier sensing in order to disrupt communi-
cation more efficiently, specially in a network of simple
wireless devices such as sensor nodes, which usually
operate over a single frequency (or a limited frequency
band) and which cannot benefit from the use of spread
spectrum or other more advanced technologies. This
article proposes the medium access (MAC) protocol
ANTIJAM that is provably robust against a powerful
reactive adversary who can jam a (1 − ε)-portion
of the time steps, where ε is an arbitrary constant.
The adversary uses carrier sensing to make informed
decisions on when it is most harmful to disrupt
communications; moreover, we allow the adversary to
be adaptive and to have complete knowledge of the
entire protocol history. Our MAC protocol is able to
make efficient use of the non-jammed time periods and
achieves an asymptotically optimal, Θ(1)-competitive
throughput in this harsh scenario. In addition, AN-
TIJAM features a low convergence time and has good
fairness properties. Our simulation results validate our
theoretical results and also show that our algorithm
manages to guarantee constant throughput where the
802.11 MAC protocol basically fails to deliver any
packets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Disruptions of the communications over a shared
medium—either because of interference of concur-
rent transmissions or intentionally—are a central
challenge in wireless computing. It is well-known
that already simple jamming attacks—without any
special hardware—constitute a threat for the widely
used IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol. Due to the prob-
lem’s relevance, there has been a significant effort
to cope with such disruption problems both from the
industry and the academia side and much progress
has been made over the last years on how to deal
with different jammer types.
While simple oblivious jammers are well-
understood today and many countermeasures ex-
ist, this article goes an important step further and
studies MAC protocols against “smart” jammers. In
particular, we argue that adversaries may behave in
an adaptive and reactive manner: adaptive in the
sense that their decisions on whether to jam at a
certain moment in time can depend on the protocol
history; and reactive in the sense that the adversary
can perform physical carrier sensing (which is part,
e.g., of the 802.11 standard) to learn whether the
channel is currently idle or not, and jam the medium
depending on these measurements.
This article presents the first medium access
(MAC) protocol called ANTIJAM that makes ef-
fective use of the few and arbitrarily distributed
non-jammed time periods, and achieves a provable
throughput despite the presence of such a strong
reactive jammer. As we will see, the throughput is
asymptotically optimal, i.e., a constant fraction of
the non-jammed time period is used for success-
ful transmissions. Besides this interesting theoretic
result, our protocol is simple to implement and
performs well also in the average case. Also, worth
to note is that our approach is at the MAC level
and may be used in conjunction with some of the
anti-jamming techniques developed at the physical
layer (e.g., frequency hopping, spread spectrum).
A. Related Work
Researchers have studied the problem of un-
intentional and malicious interference in wireless
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2networks for several years now, e.g., [6], [15], [17],
[18], [19], [21], [22], [26], [28]. Classic defense
mechanisms operate on the physical layer [19], [21]
and there exist approaches both to avoid as well as
to detect jamming. Spread spectrum and frequency
hopping technologies have been shown to be very
effective to avoid jamming with widely spread sig-
nals. However, IEEE 802.11 variants spread signals
with smaller factors [5] (IEEE 802.11b uses a
narrow spreading factor of 11 [14]). As jamming
strategies can come in many different flavors, de-
tecting jamming activities by simple methods based
on signal strength, carrier sensing, or packet delivery
ratios has turned out to be quite difficult [18].
Recent work has also studied MAC layer strate-
gies against jamming, including coding strategies
(e.g., [6]), channel surfing and spatial retreat (e.g.,
[1], [29]), or mechanisms to hide messages from
a jammer, evade its search, and reduce the impact
of corrupted messages (e.g., [27]). Unfortunately,
these methods do not help against an adaptive
jammer with full information about the history of
the protocol, like the one considered in our work.
In the theory community, work on MAC protocols
has mostly focused on efficiency. Many of these
protocols are random backoff protocols (e.g., [4],
[7], [8], [12], [24]) that do not take jamming activity
into account and, in fact, are not robust against it
(see [2] for more details). Also some theoretical
work on jamming is known (e.g., [9] for a short
overview). There are two basic approaches in the
literature. The first assumes randomly corrupted
messages (e.g. [23]), which is much easier to handle
than adaptive adversarial jamming [3]. The second
line of work either bounds the number of messages
that the adversary can transmit or disrupt with a
limited energy budget (e.g. [11], [16]), or bounds the
number of channels the adversary can jam (e.g. [10],
[20]).
The protocols in, e.g., [16] can tackle adversarial
jamming at both the MAC and network layers,
where the adversary may not only be jamming
the channel but also introducing malicious (fake)
messages (possibly with address spoofing). How-
ever, they depend on the fact that the adversarial
jamming budget is finite, so it is not clear whether
the protocols would work under heavy continuous
jamming. (The result in [11] seems to imply that
a jamming rate of 0.5 is the limit whereas the
handshaking mechanisms in [16] seem to require
an even lower jamming rate.)
Our work is motivated by the results in [3] and
[2]. In [3] it is shown that an adaptive jammer can
dramatically reduce the throughput of the standard
MAC protocol used in IEEE 802.11 with only lim-
ited energy cost on the adversary side. Awerbuch et
al. [2] initiated the study of throughput-competitive
MAC protocols under continuously running, adap-
tive jammers, and presented a protocol that achieves
a high performance under adaptive jamming.
In this article, we extend the model and result
from [2] in a crucial way: we allow the jammer
to be reactive, i.e., to listen to the current channel
state in order to make smarter jamming decisions.
We believe that the reactive jammer model is much
more realistic and hence that our study is of practical
importance. For example, by sensing the channel,
the adversary may avoid wasting energy by not
jamming idle rounds. Note however that depending
on the protocol, it may still make sense for the
adversary to jam idle rounds, e.g., to influence the
protocol execution. Indeed, due to the large number
of possible strategies a jammer can pursue, the prob-
lem becomes significantly more challenging than the
non-reactive version: Not only is the analysis more
involved, but also key modifications to the protocol
in [2] were needed. While we still build upon the
algorithmic ideas presented in [2], in order to avoid
asymmetries, our ANTIJAM protocol seeks to syn-
chronize the nodes’ sending probabilities. (This has
the desirable side effect of an improved fairness.)
While our formal analysis confirms our expectations
that the overall throughput under reactive jammers
is lower than the throughput obtainable against
non-reactive jammers, we are still able to prove
a good, constant-competitive performance, which
is also confirmed by our simulation study. As a
final remark, although this article focuses on single-
hop environments, our first insights indicate that
ANTIJAM-like strategies can also be used in multi-
hop settings (see also the recent extension of [2] to
unit disk graphs [25]).
B. Model
We study a wireless network that consists of n
honest and reliable simple wireless devices (e.g.,
sensor nodes) that are within the transmission range
of each other and which communicate over a single
frequency (or a limited, narrow frequency band).
We assume a back-logged scenario where the nodes
continuously contend for sending a packet on the
3wireless channel. A node may either transmit a
message or sense the channel at a time step, but it
cannot do both, and there is no immediate feedback
mechanism telling a node whether its transmission
was successful. A node sensing the channel may
either (i) sense an idle channel (in case no other
node is transmitting at that time), (ii) sense a busy
channel (in case two or more nodes transmit at the
time step), or (iii) receive a packet (in case exactly
one node transmits at the time step).
In addition to these nodes there is an adversary.
We allow the adversary to know the protocol and
its entire history and to use this knowledge in order
to jam the wireless channel at will at any time
(i.e, the adversary is adaptive). Whenever it jams
the channel, all nodes will notice a busy channel.
However, the nodes cannot distinguish between the
adversarial jamming or a collision of two or more
messages that are sent at the same time. We assume
that the adversary is only allowed to jam a (1− ε)-
fraction of the time steps, for an arbitrary constant
0 < ε ≤ 1.
Moreover, we allow the jammer to be reactive:
it is allowed to make a jamming decision after
it knows the actions of the nodes at the current
step. In other words, reactive jammers can deter-
mine (through physical carrier sensing) whether the
channel is currently idle or busy (either because of a
successful transmission, a collision of transmissions,
or too much background noise) and can instantly
make a jamming decision based on that information.
Those jammers arise in scenarios where, for exam-
ple, encryption is being used for communication and
where the jammer cannot distinguish between an
encrypted package and noise in the channel.
In addition, we allow the adversary to perform
bursty jamming. More formally, an adversary is
called (T, 1 − ε)-bounded for some T ∈ N and
0 < ε < 1 if for any time window of size w ≥ T
the adversary can jam at most (1− ε)w of the time
steps in that window.
The network scenario described above arises,
for example, in sensor networks, which consist
of simple wireless nodes usually running on a
single frequency and which cannot benefit from
more advanced anti-jamming techniques such as
frequency hopping or spread spectrum. In such
scenarios, a jammer will also most probably run
on power-constrained devices (e.g., solar-powered
batteries), and hence will not have enough power
to continuously jam over time (note that the time
window threshold T can be chosen large enough to
accommodate the respective jamming pattern).
This article studies competitive MAC protocols.
A MAC protocol is called c-competitive against
some (T, 1−ε)-bounded adversary (with high prob-
ability or on expectation) if, for any sufficiently
large number of time steps, the nodes manage to
perform successful message transmissions in at least
a c-fraction of the time steps not jammed by the
adversary (with high probability or on expectation).
Our goal is to design a symmetric local-control
MAC protocol (i.e., there is no central authority
controlling the nodes, and the nodes have symmetric
roles at any point in time) that is O(1)-competitive
against any (T, 1−ε)-bounded adversary. The nodes
do not know ε, but we do allow them to have a very
rough upper bound of the number n and T . More
specifically, we will assume that the nodes have a
common parameter γ = O(1/(log T + log log n)).
This is still scalable, since such an estimate leaves
room for a super-polynomial change in n and a
polynomial change in T over time, so it does not
make the problem trivial (as would be the case if
the nodes knew constant factor approximations of n
or T ).
C. Our Contributions
This article introduces and analyzes the medium
access protocol ANTIJAM. ANTIJAM is robust to a
strong adaptive and reactive jammer who can block
a constant fraction of the time and thus models a
large range of (intentional and unintentional) inter-
ference models. Nevertheless, we can show that the
ANTIJAM MAC protocol achieves a high throughput
performance by exploiting any non-blocked time in-
tervals effectively. The main theoretical contribution
is the derivation of the following theorem that shows
that ANTIJAM is asymptotically optimal in the sense
that a constant fraction of the non-jammed execution
time is used for successful transmissions:
Theorem I.1. The MAC protocol is Θ(1)-
competitive w.h.p.1 under any (T, 1 − ε)-bounded
adversary for some constant ε if the protocol is ex-
ecuted for at least Θ( 1ε logN max{T, 1εγ2 log3N})
many time steps.
We believe that ANTIJAM is interesting also from
a practical point of view, as the basic protocol
1With high probability, i.e., with probability at least 1−1/nc,
where c is a constant. As n grows to infinity, the probability tends
to 1.
4is very simple. We also report on our simulation
results. It turns out that ANTIJAM is able to benefit
from the rare and hard-to-predict time intervals
where the shared medium is available. Moreover,
ANTIJAM converges fast and allocates the shared
medium fairly to the nodes.
D. Article Organization
The remainder of this article is organized as
follows. Section II introduces the ANTIJAM MAC
protocol. Subsequently, we present a formal analysis
of the throughput performance under reactive jam-
ming (Section III). Section IV reports on the insights
gained from our simulation experiments. The article
is concluded in Section V.
II. THE ANTIJAM MAC PROTOCOL
The basic ideas of the ANTIJAM MAC protocol
are inspired by the protocols described in [13]
(which also uses access probabilities depending
on the ratio between idling and successful time
slots) and particularly [2]. However, the algorithm
in [2] does not achieve a good performance under
reactive jammers, which is due to the asymmetric
access probabilities. Therefore, in our protocol, we
explicitly try to equalize access probabilities, which
also improves fairness among the nodes.
Each node v maintains a time window threshold
estimate Tv and a counter cv . The parameter γ is the
same for every node and is set to some sufficiently
small value in O(1/(log T + log log n)). Thus, we
assume that the nodes have some polynomial esti-
mate of T and even rougher estimate of n. Let pˆ
be any constant so that 0 < pˆ ≤ 1/24. Initially,
every node v sets Tv := 1, cv := 1 and pv := pˆ.
Afterwards, the protocol works in synchronized time
steps. We assume synchronized time steps for the
analysis, but a non-synchronized execution of the
protocol would also work as long as all nodes
operate at roughly the same speed.
The basic protocol idea is simple. Suppose that
each node v decides to send a message at the current
time step with probability pv with pv ≤ pˆ. Let
p =
∑
v pv , q0 be the probability that the channel is
idle and q1 be the probability that exactly one node
is sending a message. The following claim appeared
originally in [2]. It states that if q0 = Θ(q1), then the
cumulative sending probability p is constant, which
in turn implies that at any non-jammed time step
we have constant probability of having a successful
transmission. Hence our protocol aims at adjusting
the sending probabilities pv of the nodes such that
q0 = Θ(q1), in spite of the reactive adversarial
jamming activity. This will be achieved by using a
multiplicative increase/decrease game for the prob-
abilities pv and by synchronizing all the nodes,
both in terms of sending probabilities and their own
estimates on the time window threshold estimate
Tv’s, at every successful transmission.
Claim II.1. q0 · p ≤ q1 ≤ q01−pˆ · p.
Now we present our ANTIJAM protocol:
In each step, each node v does the following. v
decides with probability pv to send a message along
with a tuple: (pv, cv, Tv). If it decides not to send
a message, it checks the following two conditions:
1) If v senses an idle channel, then pv :=
min{(1 + γ)pv, pˆ} and Tv := Tv − 1.
2) If v successfully receives a message along
with the tuple of (pnew, cnew, Tnew), then
pv := (1 + γ)
−1pnew, cv := cnew, and
Tv := Tnew.
Afterwards, v sets cv := cv + 1. If cv > Tv then
it does the following: v sets cv := 1, and if there
was no idle step among the past Tv time steps, then
pv := (1 + γ)
−1pv and Tv := Tv + 2.
III. ANALYSIS
Now we restate Theorem I.1 more precisely. We
will prove this more technical version of Theo-
rem I.1. Let N = max{T, n}.
Theorem III.1. The ANTIJAM protocol is
e−Θ(1/ε
2)-competitive w.h.p. under any (T, 1 − ε)-
bounded adversary if the protocol is executed for
at least Θ( 1ε logN max{T, (eδ/ε
2
/εγ2) log3N})
many time steps, where δ is a sufficiently large
constant.
In our analysis, we will make use of the following
well-known relations.
Lemma III.2. For all 0 < x < 1 it holds that
e−x/(1−x) ≤ 1− x ≤ e−x
Lemma III.3. Consider any set of binary random
variables X1, . . . , Xn. Suppose that there are val-
ues p1, . . . , pn ∈ [0, 1] with E[
∏
i∈S Xi] ≤
∏
i∈S pi
for every set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Then it holds for
5X =
∑n
i=1Xi and µ =
∑n
i=1 pi and any δ > 0
that
P[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)µ
≤ e− δ
2µ
2(1+δ/3) .
If, on the other hand, it holds that E[
∏
i∈S Xi] ≥∏
i∈S pi for every set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, then it holds
for any 0 < δ < 1 that
P[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤
(
e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
)µ
≤ e−δ2µ/2.
Let V be the set of all nodes. Let pt(v) be node
v’s access probability pv at the beginning of the t-th
time step. Furthermore, let pt =
∑
v∈V pt(v). Let
I be a time frame consisting of αε logN subframes
I ′ of size f = max{T, αβ2εγ2 eδ/ε
2
log3N}, where α,
β and δ are sufficiently large constants. Let F =
α
ε logN · f denote the size of I .
First, we will derive some simple facts on the
behavior of ANTIJAM. We then show that given a
certain minimal initial cumulative probability pt in
a subframe, the cumulative probability cannot be
smaller at the end of the subframe. We proceed to
show that ANTIJAM performs well in time periods
in which pt is bounded by δ/ε2 for some constant
δ. Finally, we show that for any jamming strategy,
ANTIJAM has a cumulative probability of pt ≤ δ/ε2
for most of the time, which yields our main theorem.
We start with some simple facts. Fact III.4 shows
that the protocol synchronizes the sending probabil-
ities of the nodes (up to a factor of (1 + γ)), and
that all values cv and Tv are also synchronized.
Fact III.4. Right after a successful transmission
of the tuple (p′, c′, T ′), (pv, cv, Tv) = ((1 +
γ)−1p′, c′, T ′) for all receiving nodes v and
(pu, cu, Tu) = (p
′, c′, T ′) for the sending node u.
In particular, for any time step t after a successful
transmission by node u, (cv, Tv) = (cw, Tw) for all
nodes v, w ∈ V .
The next fact follows from the protocol and
Fact III.4, and they help one understand how the
cumulative probabilities vary over time with suc-
cessful transmissions, idle time steps, etc.
Fact III.5. For any time step t after a successful
transmission or a well-initialized state of the proto-
col (in which (pv, cv, Tv) = (pˆ, 1, 1) for all nodes
v) it holds:
1. If the channel is idle at time t then (i) if pv =
pˆ for all v, then pt+1 = pt; (ii) if pu = pˆ and
pv = (1 + γ)
−1pˆ for all nodes v 6= u, then pt+1 =
(1+γ−O(1/n))pt (because all nodes except for u
increase their sending probability by a factor (1+γ)
from pˆ/(1 + γ).); or (iii) if pv < pˆ for all nodes v,
then pt+1 = (1 + γ)pt.
2. If there is a successful transmission at time t,
and if cv ≤ Tv or there was an idle time step in
the previous Tv rounds, then (i) if the sender is the
same as the last successful sender, then pt+1 = pt
(because for the sender u, pu(t + 1) = pu(t), and
the other nodes remain at pu(t + 1)/(1 + γ) =
pu(t)/(1 + γ).); if (ii) the sender w is different
from the last successful sender u and pv = pˆ for
all nodes v (including u and w), then pt+1 =
(1 + γ − O(1/n))−1pt (all nodes except w reduce
their sending probability.); or (iii) if the sender w
is different from the last successful sender u and
pv < pˆ for at least one node v (including u and
w), then pt+1 = (1 + γ)−1pt (because at time
t, for all nodes v 6= u: pv(t) = pu(t)/(1 + γ);
subsequently, pw(t + 1) = pw(t) and for all nodes
v 6= w: pv(t+ 1) = pw(t+ 1)/(1 + γ).)
3. If the channel is busy at time t, then pt+1 = pt
when ignoring the case that cv > Tv .
Whenever cv > Tv and there has not been an idle
time step during the past Tv steps, then pt+1 is, in
addition to the actions specified in the two cases
above, reduced by a factor of (1 + γ).
We can now prove the following crucial lemma.
Lemma III.6. For any subframe I ′ in which ini-
tially pt0 ≥ 1/(f2(1 + γ)
√
2f ), the last time step t
of I ′ again satisfies pt ≥ 1/(f2(1 + γ)
√
2f ), w.h.p.
Proof: We start with the following claim about
the maximum number of times the nodes decrease
their probabilities in I ′ due to cv > Tv .
Claim III.7. If in subframe I ′ the number of idle
time steps is at most k, then every node v increases
Tv by 2 at most k/2 +
√
f many times.
Proof: Only idle time steps reduce Tv . If there
is no idle time step during the last Tv many steps,
Tv is increased by 2. Suppose that k = 0. Then the
number of times a node v increases Tv by 2 is upper
bounded by the largest possible ` so that
∑`
i=0 T
0
v +
2i ≤ f , where T 0v is the initial size of Tv . For any
T 0v ≥ 1, ` ≤
√
f , so the claim is true for k = 0.
At best, each additional idle time step allows us to
reduce all thresholds for v by 1, so we are searching
for the maximum ` so that
∑`
i=0 max{T 0v + 2i −
6k, 1} ≤ f . This ` is upper bounded by k/2 +√f ,
which proves our claim.
This claim allows us to show the following claim.
Claim III.8. Suppose that for the first time step t0
in I ′, pt0 ∈ [1/(f2(1 + γ)
√
2f ), 1/f2]. Then there
is a time step t in I ′ with pt ≥ 1/f2, w.h.p.
Proof: Suppose that there are g non-jammed
time steps in I ′. Let k0 be the number of these
steps with an idle channel and k1 be the number of
these steps with a successful message transmission.
Furthermore, let k2 be the maximum number of
times a node v increases Tv by 2 in I ′. If all time
steps t in I ′ satisfy pt < 1/f2, then it must hold
that
k0 − log1+γ(1/pt0) ≤ k1 + k2.
This is because no v has reached a point with
pt(v) = pˆ in this case, so Fact III.5 implies that
for each time step t with an idle channel, pt+1 =
(1 + γ)pt. Thus, at most log1+γ(1/pt0) time steps
with an idle channel would be needed to get pt to
1/f2, and then there would have to be a balance
between further increases (that are guaranteed to be
caused by an idle channel) and decreases (that might
be caused by a successful transmission or the case
cv > Tv) of pt in order to avoid the case pt ≥ 1/f2.
The number of times we can allow an idle channel is
maximized if all successful transmissions and cases
where cv > Tv cause a reduction of pt. So we need
k0 − log1+γ(1/pt0) ≤ k1 + k2 to hold to avoid the
case pt ≥ 1/f2 somewhere in I ′.
We know from Claim III.7 that k2 ≤ k0/2 +
√
f .
Hence,
k0 ≤ 2 log1+γ f +
√
f + k1 + k0/2 +
√
f
⇒ k0 ≤ 4 log1+γ f + 2k1 + 4
√
f
Suppose that 4 log1+γ f + 4
√
f ≤ εf/4, which
is true if f = Ω(1/ε2) is sufficiently large (which
is true for ε = Ω(1/ log3N)). Since g ≥ εf due
to our adversarial model, it follows that we must
satisfy k0 ≤ 2k1 + g/4.
Certainly, for any time step t with pt ≤ 1/f2,
P[≥ 1 message transmitted at t] ≤ 1/f2
Suppose for the moment that no time step is jammed
in I ′. Then E[k1] ≤ (1/f2)f = 1/f . In order to
prove a bound on k1 that holds w.h.p., we can use
the general Chernoff bounds stated above. For any
step t, let the binary random variable Xt be 1 if and
only if at least one message is sent at time t and
pt ≤ 1/f2. Then
P[Xt = 1] = P[pt ≤ 1/f2] · P[≥ 1 msg sent | pt ≤ 1/f2]
≤ 1/f2
and it particularly holds that for any set S of time
steps prior to some time step t that
P[Xt = 1 |
∏
s∈S
Xs = 1] ≤ 1/f2
Then, we have
P[
∏
s∈S
Xs = 1] = P[X1 = 1] · P[X2 = 1|X1 = 1]
· P[X3 = 1|
∏
s=1,2
Xs = 1]
·...·
· P[X|S| = 1|
∏
s=1,2,...,|S|−1
Xs = 1]
≤ (1/f2)|S|
and
E[
∏
s∈S
Xs = 1] = P[
∏
s∈S
Xs = 1] ≤ (1/f2)|S|
Thus, the Chernoff bounds and our choice of f
imply that either
∑
t∈I′ Xt < εf/4 and pt ≤ 1/f2
throughout I ′ w.h.p., or there must be a time step t
in I ′ with pt > 1/f2 which would finish the proof.
Therefore, unless pt > 1/f2 at some point in I ′,
k1 < εf/4 and k0 > (1 − ε/4)f w.h.p. As the
reactive adversary can now reduce k0 by at most
f − g when leaving g non-jammed steps, it follows
that for any adversary, k0 > (1 − ε/4)f − (f −
g) = g − (ε/4)f . That, however, would violate our
condition above that k0 ≤ 2k1 + g/4 as that can
only hold given the bounds on g and k1 if k0 ≤
g − (ε/4)f .
Note that the choice of g is not oblivious as
the adversary may adaptively decide to set g based
on the history of events. Hence, we need to sum
up the probabilities over all adversarial strategies
of selecting g in order to show that none of them
succeeds, but since there are only f many, and for
each the claimed property holds w.h.p., the claim
follows.
Similar to this claim, we can also prove the
following claim.
Claim III.9. Suppose that for the first time step t0
in I ′, pt0 ≥ 1/f2. Then there is no time step t in
I ′ with pt < 1f2(1+γ)√2f , w.h.p.
Proof: Consider some fixed time step t in I ′
and let I ′′ = (t0, t]. Suppose that there are g non-
jammed time steps in I ′′. If g ≤ β logN for a
7(sufficiently large) constant β, then it follows for the
probability pt at the end of I ′′ due to Claim III.7
that
pt ≥ 1
f2
· (1 + γ)−(2β logN+
√
f) ≥ 1
f2(1 + γ)
√
2f
given that ε = Ω(1/ log3N), because at most
β logN decreases of pt can happen due to a suc-
cessful transmission and at most β logN/2 +
√
f
further decreases of pt can happen due to exceeding
Tv .
So suppose that g > β logN . Let k0 be the
number of these steps with an idle channel and k1 be
the number of these steps with a successful message
transmission. Furthermore, let k2 be the maximum
number of times a node v increases Tv in I ′′. If
pt <
1
f2(1+γ)
√
2f then it must hold that
k0 ≤ k1 + k2
Since k2 ≤ k0/2 +
√
f , this implies that k0 ≤
2k1 + 2
√
f ≤ 2k1 + g/4. Thus, we are back to
the case in the proof of Claim III.8, which shows
that k0 ≤ 2k1 +g/4 does not hold w.h.p., given that
g > β logN and we never have the case in I ′′ that
pt > 1/f
2.
If there is a step t′ in I ′′ with pt′ > 1/f2, we
prune I ′′ to the interval (t′, t] and repeat the case
distinction above. As there are at most f time steps
in I ′′, the claim follows.
Combining Claims III.8 and III.9 completes the
proof of Lemma III.6.
Lemma III.10 shows that for times of low cumu-
lative probabilities, ANTIJAM yields a good perfor-
mance.
Lemma III.10. Consider any subframe I ′, and let
δ > 1 be a sufficiently large constant. Suppose that
at the beginning of I ′, pt0 ≥ 1/(f2(1 + γ)
√
2f )
and Tv ≤
√
F/2 for every node v. If pt ≤ δ/ε2
for at least half of the non-jammed time steps in
I ′, then ANTIJAM is at least δ8(1−pˆ)ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2 -
competitive in I ′.
Proof: A time step t in I is called useful if we
either have an idle channel or a successful transmis-
sion at time t (i.e., the time step is not jammed and
there are no collisions) and pt ≤ δ/ε2. Let k be the
number of useful time steps in I ′. Furthermore, let
k0 be the number of useful time steps in I ′ with an
idle channel, k1 be the number of useful time steps
in I ′ with a successful transmission and k2 be the
maximum number of times a node v reduces pv in
I ′ because of cv > Tv . Recall that k = k0 + k1.
Moreover, the following claim holds:
Claim III.11. If n ≥ (1 + γ)δ/(ε2pˆ), then
k0 − log1+γ(δ/(ε2 · pt0)) ≤ k′1 + k2
where k′1 is the number of useful time steps with
a successful transmission in which the sender is
different from the previously successful sender.
Proof: According to Fact III.5, pv ∈ [(1 +
γ)−1p, p] for some access probability p for all time
steps in I ′. Hence, if pt ≤ δ/ε2 and n ≥ (1 +
γ)δ/(ε2pˆ), then pv(t) ≤ pˆ/(1 + γ). This implies
that whenever there is a useful time step t ∈ I with
an idle channel, then pt+1 = (1+γ)pt. Thus, it takes
at most log1+γ(δ/(ε
2 ·pt0)) many useful time steps
with an idle channel to get from pt0 to a cumulative
probability of at least δ/ε2. On the other hand,
each of the k′1 successful transmissions reduces the
cumulative probability by (1 + γ). Therefore, once
the cumulative probability is at δ/ε2, we must have
k0 ≤ k′1 + k2 since otherwise there must be at
least one useful time step where the cumulative
probability is more than δ/ε2, which contradicts the
definition of a useful time step.
Since pt0 ≥ 1/(f2(1 + γ)
√
2f ) it holds that
log1+γ(δ/(ε
2 · pt0)) ≤ log1+γ(δf2/ε2) +
√
2f
From Lemma III.7 we also know that k2 ≤ k0/2 +√
f . Hence,
k0 ≤ 2k′1 + 2 · log1+γ(δf2/ε2) + 2 · (
√
f +
√
2f)
≤ 2k′1 + 6
√
f
if f is sufficiently large. Also, k0 = k−k1 and k′1 ≤
k1. Therefore, k−k1 ≤ 2k1 + 6
√
f or equivalently,
k1 ≥ k/3− 2
√
f
It remains to find a lower bound for k.
Claim III.12. Let g be the number of non-jammed
time steps t in I ′ with pt ≤ δ/ε2. If g ≥ εf/2 then
k ≥ δ
2(1− pˆ)ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2 · g
w.h.p.
Proof: Consider any (T, 1−ε)-bounded jammer
for I ′. Suppose that of the non-jammed time steps t
with pt ≤ δ/ε2, s0 have an idle channel and s1 have
a busy channel. It holds that s0 + s1 = g ≥ εf/2.
For any one of the non-jammed time steps with an
idle channel, the probability that it is useful is one,
and for any one of the non-jammed time steps with
8a busy channel, the probability that it is useful (in
this case, that it has a successful transmission) is at
least∑
v
pv
∏
w 6=v
(1− pw) ≥ 1
1− pˆ
∑
v
pv
∏
w
(1− pw)
≥ 1
1− pˆ
∑
v
pv
∏
w
e−pw/(1−pˆ)
=
1
1− pˆ
∑
v
pve
−p/(1−pˆ)
=
p
1− pˆ e
−p/(1−pˆ)
where p is the cumulative probability at the step.
Since pt ≤ δ/ε2, it follows that the probability of a
busy time step to be useful is at least
δ
(1− pˆ)ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2
Thus,
E[k] ≥ s0 + δ
(1− pˆ)ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2s1
≥ δ
(1− pˆ)ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2 · g
since k is minimized for s0 = 0 and s1 = g.
Since our lower bound for the probability of
a busy step to be useful holds independently for
all non-jammed busy steps t with pt ≤ δ/ε2 and
E[k] ≥ α logN for our choice of g, it follows from
the Chernoff bounds that k ≥ E[k]/2 w.h.p.
From Claim III.12 it follows that
k1 ≥ ( δ
2(1− pˆ)ε2 e
−δ/(1−pˆ)ε2 · g)/3− 2
√
f
w.h.p., which completes the proof of Lemma III.10.
It remains to consider the case that for less than
half of the non-jammed time steps t in I ′, pt ≤
δ/ε2. Fortunately, this does not happen w.h.p.
Lemma III.13. Suppose that at the beginning of I ′,
Tv ≤
√
F/2 for every node v. Then at most half of
the non-jammed time steps t can have the property
that pt > δ/ε2 w.h.p.
Proof: Recall from Fact III.5 that as long as the
access probabilities of the nodes do not hit pˆ, the
cumulative probability only changes by a (1 + γ)-
factor in both directions. Suppose that δ is selected
so that δ/ε2 represents one of these values. Let H
be the set of time steps t ∈ I ′ with the property
that either pt = δ/ε2 and the channel is idle or
pt ≥ (1 + γ)δ/ε2. Now, we define a step t to be
useful if t ∈ H and there is either an idle channel or
a successful transmission at t. Let k be the number
of useful time steps in H . Furthermore, let k0 be the
number of useful time steps with an idle channel, k1
be the number of useful time steps with a successful
transmission and k2 be the maximum number of
times a node v reduces pv in H because of cv > Tv .
It holds that k = k0 + k1.
Let us cut the time steps in H into passes where
each pass (t, p, S) consists of a time step t with
pt = p in which there is an idle channel (or t is the
beginning of I ′ if there is no such idle channel in
I ′) and S is the sequence of all non-idle time steps
t′ > t with pt′ = (1 + γ)p following t until a time
step t′′ is reached in which pt′′ < p (or the end of
I ′ is reached if there is no such step). t′′ is either
due to cv > Tv or a successful transmission. More
precisely, we require that for any pair of passes
(t, p, S) and (t′, p′, S′) with p′ = p and final time
step t′′ in S, (t′ ∪ S′) ∩ [t, t′′] = ∅, but passes with
p 6= p′ are allowed to violate this (by one being
nested into the other). It is not difficult to see that for
any distribution of cumulative probabilities over the
time steps of I ′ one can organize the time steps in H
into passes as demanded above. Based on that, the
following claim can be easily shown, where k′1 ≤ k1
is the number of useful time steps with a successful
transmission by a node different from the previously
successful node.
Claim III.14.
k0 ≥ k′1 − log1+γ max{p0/(δ/ε2), 1}
where p0 is the initial cumulative probability in I ′.
This is because there can be at most
log1+γ max{p0/(δ/ε2), 1} many passes not
starting with an idle step but the initial step of
I ′, and every pass has at most one step counting
towards k′1. This also implies the following claim.
Claim III.15. For any collection P of passes,
k0 ≥ k′1 −∆
where k0 and k′1 are defined w.r.t. these passes and
∆ is the number of different p-values in P .
Also, the following claim holds.
Claim III.16.
|H| ≤ (k + log1+γ max{p0/(δ/ε2), 1})
√
F
where p0 is the initial cumulative probability in I ′.
9Proof: If at the beginning of I ′, Tv ≤
√
F/2
for every node v, then Tv ≤
√
F for every node v
at any time during I ′. Hence, after at most 2
√
F
non-useful steps we run into the situation that cv >
Tv for every node v, which reduces the cumulative
probability by a factor of (1 + γ). Given that we
only have k useful steps and we may initially start
with a probability p0 > δ/ε2, there can be at most
(k + log1+γ max{p0/(δ/ε2), 1})
√
F time steps in
H , which proves the claim.
For the calculations below recall the definition of
f with the constants α and β that are assumed to
be sufficiently large. If k ≤ α logN , then it follows
from Claim III.16 that
|H| ≤ (α logN + log1+γ N)
√
F ≤ εf/β
Thus, the number of non-jammed time steps in H
is also at most εf/β, and since β can be arbitrarily
large, Lemma III.13 follows.
It remains to consider the case that k > α logN .
Let us assume that H contains at least εf/2 non-
jammed time steps. Our goal is to contradict that
statement in order to show that the lemma is true.
For this we will show that Claim III.15 is violated
w.h.p.
Let Tp be the number of all time steps cov-
ered by passes (t′, p′, S′) with p′ = p. Certainly,∑
p≥δ/ε2 Tp = |H|. Let a pass (t, p, S) be called
bad if the jamming rate in S is more than (1−ε/8).
A cumulative probability p is called bad if the
number of time steps covered by bad passes in p
is more than (1− ε/8)Tp. A bad p contains at least
(1− ε/8)2Tp jammed time steps. Since the number
of jammed time steps in H is at most |H| − εf/2
it holds that∑
p bad
(1− ε/8)2Tp ≤ |H| − εf/2
Hence, it holds for the good probabilities that∑
p good
Tp = |H| −
∑
p bad
Tp
≥ |H| − (1− ε/8)−2(|H| − εf/2)
≥ f − (1− ε/8)−2(f − εf/2) ≥ εf/4
In the following, let φ = δ/ε2 and Φ =
ln(f/ logN). For each p ≥ φ let bp be the number
non-idle time steps among the Tp time steps asso-
ciated with p-passes and k0,p be the number of idle
time steps associated with p-passes. A good proba-
bility p is called helpful if bp ≥ k0,p/P[idle | p] and
p < Φ.
For a cumulative probability p ≥ Φ, P[idle | p] ≤
e−Φ = (logN)/f and P[success | p] ≤ Φe−Φ ≤
ln(f/ logN) · (logN)/f . Hence, k ≤ ln f · logN
on expectation, and from the Chernoff bounds it
follows that k ≤ 2 ln f ·logN w.h.p., so Claim III.16
implies that the number of time steps in I ′ with
cumulative probability p ≥ Φ is at most
(2 ln f · logN + log1+γ N)
√
F ≤ εf/β
If we sum up over all non-helpful probabilities p
with φ ≤ p < Φ, they cover at most
log1+γ Φ∑
i=0
1/e−(1+γ)
i ≤ 2 · f/ logN = o(f)
many time steps, so∑
p helpful
Tp ≥ εf/6
if β is large enough. If φ ≤ pt < Φ and Φ ≤ 1/γ
(which is true if γ = O(1/(log T + log log n)) is
small enough), then it holds for any time step t′
with pt′ ≤ (1 + γ)pt that
P[successful transmission at t′]
=
∑
v
pv(t
′)
∏
w 6=v
(1− pw(t′))
≥
∑
v
(1 + γ)pv(t)
∏
w 6=v
(1− (1 + γ)pw(t))
≥
∑
v
(1 + γ)pv(t)
1− pˆ
∏
w
(1− (1 + γ)pw(t))
≥
∑
v
(1 + γ)pv(t)
1− pˆ e
−∑w(1+γ)pw(t)/(1−(1+γ)pw(t))
=
∑
v
(1 + γ)pv(t)
1− pˆ e
−(1+γ)pt/(1−(1+γ)pt/n)
=
(1 + γ)pt
1− pˆ e
−(1+γ)pt−2p2t/n
≥ (1 + γ)pt
1− pˆ e
−pt−2
≥ (1 + γ)δ
(1− pˆ)e2εP[idle channel at t]
Let k1,p be the number of successful time steps as-
sociated with p-passes. For each helpful probability
p it holds that E[k1,p] is at least
ε/8 · k0,p · ε/8P[idle | p] · P[success | (1 + γ)p]
≥ ε/8 · k0,p · ε/8P[idle | p] ·
(1 + γ)δ
(1− pˆ)e2ε2 · P[idle | p]
≥ 2
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if δ is a sufficiently large constant. Hence,∑
p helpful k1,p ≥ 2
∑
p helpful k0,p and since∑
p helpful
Tp · P[success | (1 + γ)p]
≥ (εf/6) · Φ · e−Φ/(1−Φ/n)
≥ (εf/6) · Φ · e−Φ−1
= (εf/6) · ln(f/ logN) · (e logN)/f ≥ c logN
for any constant c, the Chernoff bounds imply that∑
p helpful k1,p ≥ (3/2)
∑
p helpful k0,p w.h.p. In
order to proceed, we need the following claim.
Claim III.17. For any collection P of passes it
holds that
E[k′1] ≥ (1− (1 + γ)/n)k1
where k1 and k′1 are defined w.r.t. P .
Proof: Because of Fact III.5, the probability
that a successful transmission is done by a node
different from the node of the last successful trans-
mission is equal to
1− (1 + γ)p
(n+ γ)p
≥ 1− 1 + γ
n
.
To see this, observe that among the cumulative
probability p, if the last sender u has a share
pu(t) = x, all other nodes v have a share x/(1+γ),
and
pu(t)∑
v∈V pv(t)
=
x
(n− 1) · x1+γ + x
=
1 + γ
n+ γ
Hence, E[k′1] ≥ (1− (1 + γ)/n)k1.
The claim implies that∑
p helpful
k′1,p >
∑
p helpful
k0,p + log1+γ max{Φ/(δ/ε2), 1}
w.h.p., which violates Claim III.15. This completes
the proof of Lemma III.13.
Notice that by the choice of f and F , Tv never
exceeds
√
F/2 for any v when initially Tv = 1 for
all v. Hence, the prerequisites of the lemmas are
satisfied. We can also show the following lemma,
which shows that Tv remains bounded over time.
Lemma III.18. For any time frame I in which
initially Tv ≤
√
F/2 for all v, also Tv ≤
√
F/2
for all v at the end of I w.h.p.
Proof: We already know that in each subframe
I ′ in I , at least εf/2 of the non-jammed time steps t
in I ′ satisfy pt ≤ δ/ε2 w.h.p. Hence, for all (T, 1−
ε)-bounded jamming strategies, there are at least
(δ/ε2) · e−δ/ε2 · εf/2
useful time steps in I ′ w.h.p. Due to the lower bound
of pt ≥ 1/(f2(1 + γ)
√
f ) for all time steps in I
w.h.p. we can also conclude that
k0 ≥ k′1 + k2 − log1+γ((δ/ε2) · f2(1 + γ)
√
f )
Because of Claims III.7 and III.17 it follows that
k0 ≥ k1/3
w.h.p. Since k0 + k1 = k and k ≥ (δ/ε2) · e−δ/ε2 ·
εf/2 it follows that k0 = Ω(f). Therefore, there
must be at least one time point in I ′ with Tv = 1
for all v ∈ V . This in turn ensures that Tv ≤
√
F/2
for all v at the end of I w.h.p.
With Lemma III.18, we show that Lemma III.13
is true for a polynomial number of subframes. Then,
Lemma III.13 and Lemma III.18 together imply that
Lemma III.10 holds for a polynomial number of
subframes. Hence, our main Theorem III.1 follows.
Along the same line as in [2], we can show that
ANTIJAM is self-stabilizing, so the throughput result
can be extended to an arbitrary sequence of time
frames.
IV. SIMULATION
We have implemented a simulator to study ad-
ditional properties of our protocol. This section re-
ports on some of our results. Our focus here is on the
qualitative nature of the performance of ANTIJAM,
and we did not optimize the parameters to obtain the
best constants. We consider three different jamming
strategies for a reactive jammer that is (T, 1 − ε)-
bounded, for different ε values and where T = 100:
(1) one that jams busy channels with probability
(1−ε); (2) one that jams busy channels determinis-
tically (as long the jamming budget is not used up);
(3) one that jams idle channels deterministically (as
long as the jamming budges is not used up).
We define throughput as the number of successful
transmissions over the number of non-jammed time
steps.
A. Throughput
In a first set of experiments we study the through-
put as a function of the network size and ε. We
evaluate the throughput performance for each type
of adversary introduced above, see Figure 1. For all
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Fig. 1. Throughput under three different jamming strategies as a function of the network size and ε, where pˆ = 1/24 (left: ε = 0.5,
right: ε = 0.3).
Fig. 2. Throughput as a function of γ under three different jamming strategies. Left: ε = 0.2, Right: ε = 0.5).
three strategies, the throughput is basically constant,
independently of the network size; this is in accor-
dance with our theoretical insight of Theorem III.1.
We can see that given our conditions on ε and T , the
strategy that jams busy channels deterministically
results in the lowest throughput. Hence, in the
remaining experiments described in this section, we
will focus on this particular strategy. As expected,
jamming idle channels does not affect the protocol
behavior much.
In our simulations, ANTIJAM makes effective use
of the non-jammed time periods, yielding 20%-40%
successful transmissions even without optimizing
the protocol parameters. In additional experiments
we also studied the throughput as a function of γ,
see Figure 2. As expected, the throughput declines
slightly for large γ, but this effect is small. (Note
that for very small γ, the convergence time becomes
large and the experiments need run for a long time
in order not to underestimate the real throughput.)
B. Convergence Time
Besides a high throughput, fast convergence is
the most important performance criterion of a MAC
protocol. The traces in Figure 3 show the evolution
of the cumulative probability over time. It can be
seen that the protocol converges quickly to constant
access probabilities. (Note the logarithmic scale.)
If the initial probability for each node is high, the
protocol needs more time to bring down the low-
constant cumulative probability. Moreover, the ratio
of the time period the cumulative probability is in
the range of [ 12ε ,
2
ε ] to the time period the protocol
being executed is 92.98% when pˆ = 1/24, and
89.52% when pˆ = 1/2. This implies that for a suffi-
ciently large time period, the cumulative probability
is well bounded most of the time, which corresponds
to our theoretical insights. Figure 4 studies the
convergence time for different network sizes. We ran
the protocol 50 times, and assume that the execution
has converged when the cumulative probability p
satisfies p ∈ [0.1, 10], for at least 5 consecutive
rounds. The simulation result also confirms our the-
oretical analysis in Theorem III.1, as the number of
rounds needed to converge the execution is bounded
by Θ( 1ε logN max{T, 1εγ2 log3N}).
Figure 5 indicates that independently of the initial
values pˆ and Tv , the throughput rises quickly (up
above 20%) and stays there afterwards.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of cumulative probability over time (network
size is 1000 nodes, and ε = 0.5). Note that the plot has
logarithmic scale.
Fig. 4. ANTIJAM runtime as a function of network size for
pˆ = 1/24, and ε = 0.5.
C. Fairness
As ANTIJAM synchronizes cv , Tv , and pv values
upon message reception, the nodes are expected to
transmit roughly the same amount of messages; in
other words, our protocol is fair. Figure 6 presents a
histogram showing how the successful transmissions
are distributed among the nodes. More specifically,
we partition the number of successful transmissions
into intervals of size 4. Then, all the transmissions
are grouped according to those intervals in the
histogram.
D. Comparison to 802.11
Finally, to put ANTIJAM into perspective, as a
comparison, we implemented a simplified version
of the widely used 802.11 MAC protocol (with a
focus on 802.11a).
The configurations for the simulation are the
following: (1) the jammer is reactive and (T, 1−ε)-
bounded; (2) the unit slot time for 802.11 is set to
50µs; for simplicity, we define one time step for
Fig. 5. Convergence in a network of 1000 nodes where ε = 0.5.
Fig. 6. Fairness in a network of 1000 nodes, where ε = 0.5,
and pˆ = 1/24 (averaged over 10 runs).
ANTIJAM to be 50µs also; (3) we run ANTIJAM
and 802.11 for 4 min, which is equal to 4.8 · 106
time steps in our simulation; (4) the backoff timer
of the 802.11 MAC protocol implemented here
uses units of 50µs; (5) we omit SIFS, DIFS, and
RTS/CTS/ACK.
A comparison is summarized in Figure 7. The
throughput achieved by ANTIJAM is significantly
higher than the one by the 802.11 MAC protocol,
specially for lower values of ε, when the 802.11
MAC protocol basically fails to deliver any success-
ful message.
V. CONCLUSION
This article presented a simple distributed MAC
protocol called ANTIJAM that is able to make effi-
cient use of a shared communication medium whose
availability is changing quickly and in a hard to
predict manner over time. In particular, this article
has shown that the MAC protocol is able to achieve
a good (asymptotically optimal) throughput even
against an adaptive and reactive jammer that uses
carrier sensing for an informed decision on when to
jam, and whose strategy can depend on the entire
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Fig. 7. Throughput as a function of ε ∈ [0.05, 0.95], compared
to 802.11, averaged over 10 runs, where pˆ = 1/24.
protocol history. Our simulation results indicate that
the nodes’ access probabilities converge quickly to
a good cumulative value and yields a fair allocation
of the shared medium among the nodes.
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